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NOTES
ANONYMITY: AN EMERGING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
The rights of free speech and free association are guaranteed against
congressional and state action by the first and fourteenth amendments.
In recent cases the Supreme Court has invalidated state action requiring
identification of publications and disclosure of associational relationships,
finding the requirements to be unconstitutional restraints upon free
speech and association. The premise from which this note proceeds is
that these cases point to the emergence of anonymity as essential to the
exercise of rights under the first and fourteenth amendments.
The primary issues raised by the emergence of anonymity relate to
the character of the right and to the scope of its protection. Concerning
its character, the question is whether anonymity is per se essential to free
speech and association or whether it is essential only in the context of
certain associations and utterances. Where anonymity is recognized as
essential to the exercise of rights, there remains the question of the scope
of its protection; in other words, against what types of government interests will it be protected? The answer to this question must depend
upon the Supreme Court's standard for determining constitutionality in
a balancing of governmental against individual interests, to determine if
the governmental interest is sufficiently compelling to justify subordinating the individual interest in free speech or association.'
In analyzing the character of anonymity as a fundamental right,2
this note will concentrate upon discussion and comparison of the cases in
which the Supreme Court has invalidated disclosure requirements. Predicting the scope of protection of anonymity as an emerging concept is
necessarily more speculative. Many types of governmental action involve
requirements of disclosures by individuals; this note will examine disclosure requirements which have been upheld and will consider those requirements in light of the suggested emergence of a right to anonymity.
In Talley v. California3 the petitioner was convicted of distributing
1. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
2. When anonymity is described as a fundamental right, it is meant that the right
is fundamental as a part of the right to speak or associate. In the same sense distribution of literature is fundamental as a part of free speech, press and religion. See
Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943).
3. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
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handbills4 in violation of a Los Angeles city ordinance which prohibited
the distribution of any handbill not carrying upon its face the name and
address of the person printing and distributing it. The Supreme Court
reversed the conviction, holding the ordinance void on its face as an
abridgment of freedom of speech and press. The Court based its decision partially upon prior cases invalidating ordinances which prohibited
the distribution of handbills without licenses' or which prohibited any
public distribution of handbills.' It was found that the kind of censorship resulting from licensing and absolute prohibition would result also
from a prohibition of anonymous handbills.
The state court's grounds for sustaining the conviction had been that
the ordinance imposed no restriction upon free speech but only a requirement of identification as a means of determining responsibility for fraudulent or defamatory publications.8 The Supreme Court rejected this
argument, recalling the vital role of anonymous books and pamphlets in
the criticism of oppressive governments 9 and holding that a broad requirement of identification under all circumstances is an unconstitutional
restriction upon free speech. The holding was specifically restricted to
the broad ordinance at issue, leaving open the question of a statute limited
in its application to the specific evil which it was designed to suppress."0
In finding that the Los Angeles ordinance imposed restrictions upon free speech in the same manner as excessively broad statutes banning
publication or imposing prior restraints, the Court necessarily recognized
that freedom from public identification is essential to free speech. This
is apparent from the fact that identification was the only requirement
4. The handbills urged a boycott against merchants who carried products of manufacturers who allegedly would not offer "equal employment opportunities to Negroes,

Mexicans, and Orientals." Id. at 61.
5. Los Angeles, Cal.,
distribute any handbill in
printed on the cover, or the
person who printed, wrote,

Municipal Code § 28.06, which provides: No person shall
any place under any circumstances, which does not have
face thereof, the name and adress of the following: (a) The
compiled or manufactured the same. (b) The person who
caused the same to be distributed ...
6. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
7. Schneider v. New Jersey, Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
8. People v. Talley, 172 Cal. App. 2d 797, 332 P.2d 447 (App. Dept., Super. Ct.,
Los Angeles County 1958) ; accord, People v. Arnold, 127 Cal. App.2d 844, 273 P.2d 711
(App. Dept., Super. Ct., Los Angeles County 1954).
9. The Court noted that "Persecuted groups and sects throughout history have
been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at all."
362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960). Historical analysis of anonymous publications and their role
in society is outside the scope of this note. The subject is discussed extensively in
BLETER, MAIN CURRENTS IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN JOURNALISM (1927).
10. See Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961). There
a specific statutory requirement which was admittedly a prior restraint was held not
subject to an attack on its face.
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imposed by the ordinance. 1 ' Authority for the protection of anonymity
came from NAACP v. Alabama 2 and Bates v. Little Rock, 3 both of
which struck down state attempts to require public identification of the
membership of the NAACP.
In the NAACP case, Alabama brought suit to oust the NAACP
from the state because of failure to comply with a statute 4 requiring
foreign corporations to qualify before doing business in the state. The
state secured a court order requiring the production of certain records
including the names of all Alabama members, alleging that the records
were necessary to answer the NAACP's denial that it was conducting
intrastate business. In reversing a contempt judgment for failure to
produce the names, the Supreme Court held that immunity from compelled disclosure of the membership lists was so related to individual
members' rights of free association as to be protected by the fourteenth
amendment. The state's asserted purpose in requiring the disclosure
was held not to justify the deterrent effect on free association, since there
was no relevant correlation between the names of members and the conduct of intrastate business within the statute. This decision laid the
foundation for the emergence of anonymity. The Court found that in
the circumstances of the case free association required anonymity and
placed upon the state the burden of showing a justification for denying
that right.
The decision in Bates was based squarely on the NAACP case.
There the custodian of the local NAACP branch refused to produce the
names of all local members as required by a city license tax ordinance."
The Court held there was no relevant correlation between the names of
local members and the determination whether the activities of the local
branch brought it within the application of the statute. Therefore, no
compelling jusification was found for the deterrence of free association
which disclosure of the membership lists would cause.
In the NAACP and Bates cases the petitioners attacked the applications of the disclosure requirements, showing that the effect would be a
restraint upon their exercise of free association because of threats of
In the Talley case the ordinance
economic and even physical reprisals.'
was attacked on its face, and no proof was offered that the disclosure
11.

See note 5 supra.

\
12. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
13. 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
14. ALA. CODE tit. 10 §§ 192-198 (1940).
15. Little Rock, Ark., Ordinance 7444, as amended (1957).
16. 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958) ; 361 U.S. 516, 523-4 (1960) ; see generally Freedom

of Association, 4

RACE

REL. L. REP. 207 (1959) (containing a discussion of state efforts

to curtail the NAACP).
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would restrain the petitioner's exercise of free speech." The dissent
argued that a showing of restraint was necessary and that the majority
was unwarrantably expanding precedent by assuming restraint from the
mere existence of an identification requirement.
It may be argued that the cases merely differ in their method of
attack and that Talley does not expand the protection of anonymity from
the case-by-case weighing of government interest against a specific showing of likelihood of restraint.' 8 The NAACP and Bates decisions were
based upon the absence of relevant correlation between the disclosure requirements and the asserted purposes, but Talley was based upon an ordinance which was broader than necessary for its asserted purpose. There
is authority that an execessively broad statute limiting first amendment
rights is subject to attack on its face without proof of an abuse of power
in the particular case."0 But the basis for such an attack is that the statute
does impose a restraint, e.g., prior censorship" or absolute ban upon distribution, 2 and so must be narrowly limited to the specific evil it is designed to suppress if it is to be constitutional. Talley fits this analysis
only if public identification is per se restrictive, and that is precisely the
point with which the dissent took issue. The majority admitted that
the NAACP and Bates cases were based upon showings in the record and
stated that "there are times and circumstances when states may not compel members of groups engaged in the dissemination of ideas to be publicly identified."" If the existence of restraint based upon public identification depends upon the circumstances, then the statute should not be
subject to attack on its face because of its breadth until the circumstances are shown. Therefore, it can be contended that the Talley case
does expand precedent in not requiring a showing of the specific circumstances which make anonymity essential to free speech.
The case of Shelton v. Tsecker" was decided in the current term, relying upon NAACP, Bates and Talley. The Court held unconstitutional
an Arkansas statute" which compelled every teacher, as a condition of
17. 362 U.S. 60, 69 (1960).
18. By using the case-by-case method the Court was able to distinguish the NAACP
case from Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928). That case upheld a New York
statutory disclosure requirement as applied to the Ku Klux Klan.
19. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355
U.S. 313 (1958); Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1956); see generally Note, 61

Hazv. L. Rxv. 1208 (1948).

20. Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958); see also Times Film Corp. v.
City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961) (for the proposition that a specific statute
imposing a prior restraint is not subject to attack on its face).
21. Schneider v. New Jersey, Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
22. 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960).

23. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
24. Arjc. STAT. §§ 80-1229-1232 (1958).
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employment in the public school system, to file an annual affidavit listing
every organization to which he had contributed or belonged within the
preceding five years. The case was distinguished from NAACP and
Bates in that there was found to be a relevant correlation between associational membership and competency, and the state's right to investigate
competency of teachers was not disputed. But the Court found that
compulsory disclosure of all associational ties was an impairment of free
association (citing the Bates case) when considered against the Arkansas
teacher employment system which had no tenure or other provision for
job security. Then, citing the Talley case, the Court held that the comprehensive requirement far exceeded the legitimate scope of state inquiry
and was an unconstitutional interference with the teacher's rights to free
association.
In the Shelton case there was some evidence in the record that the
affidavits might be disclosed to the public,25 but the element of general
disclosure was not essential to the decision. Rather, restraint was found
in the "pressure upon a teacher to avoid any ties which might displease
those who control his professional destiny."2 Here the Court dealt with
a broad statute as in Talley; but the statute was considered only in its
application to teachers employed at will, since the absence of job security
was regarded as material to the teachers' reluctance to disclose membership in organizations which might be objectionable to their employers.
The Shelton case does not support the position that anonymity is per se
essential to free association, as it is suggested that Talley does (in regards to free speech). But the case does seem to carry the protection
further than NAACP and Bates. Here the Court does not require proof
of the likelihood of restraint, but appears to take notice that restraint is
likely to follow from the disclosures.
Whether anonymity is per se essential to free speech and association
or is essential only in certain contexts, it is certain that there are some
situations in which the right will be protected. The four cases discussed
have some limitations, however, which are relevant in considering both
the character and the scope of anonymity as a protected right. In all
four cases, the rights involved have some connection with racial discrimination," a policy which the Supreme Court has consistently struck down
25. 364 U.S. 479, 486 n. 7 (1960).
26. Ibid.
27. See note 4 itpra for the racial discrimination connection in the Talley case.
The statute in the Shelton case was not considered by the Court as an effort of Arkansas
to curtail activities of the NAACP or other groups, but the potentiality of the statute's
use for that purpose is apparent. In the District Court proceeding which upheld the
statute, an Arkansas statute prohibiting state employment of NAACP members was
invalidated. See 174 F. Supp. 351 (1959).
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in recent years.2" Further, in determining the scope of protection of
anonymity, the balance between governmental and individual interests
becomes important. In the cases discussed, the balance was not extremely
difficult to weigh. In NAACP and Bates there were really no governmental interests to balance, since the disclosure requirements were not
reasonably related to the asserted purposes. In Talley and Shelton the
breadth of the requirements made them unconstitutional under settled
principles.2" It might even be said that these cases could be decided without reaching the actual weighing of interests, because of the factors discussed. The question then arises as to how the Supreme Court will deal
with anonymity in situations where the balance is difficult to weigh.
Many states have enacted corrupt practices statutes which prohibit
the distribution of anonymous publications about political candidates.3"
These statutes have not been tested in the Supreme Court, but generally
they have been upheld in state courts.3 In State v. Freeman" the Kansas
Supreme Court upheld an act prohibiting circulation of anonymous publications criticizing candidates for public office,3 holding that the requirement of identification was not a denial of liberty. In State v. Babst 4
the Ohio Supreme Court upheld a broad statute prohibiting anonymous
circulars or advertisements designed to promote or injure a candidate or
to influence voters.3
The argument in the Freeman case that a requirement of public identification is not a denial of liberty but only a part of the exercise of liberty would seem to be refuted by the recent Supreme Court decisions.
The same is true of the reasoning of a Pennsylvania court" that the mere
circumstance of anonymity suggests malice and falsity in a publication.
Recognizing that anonymity can be essential to free speech, the questions
are whether the corrupt practices statutes are limited to situations with
28.

tion, 349
29.

See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) ; Brown v. Board of Educa-

U.S. 294 (1954) ; United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960).

See authorities cited note 16 supra.

30. See generally Nutting, Freedom of Silence: Constitutional Protection Against
Governmental IntrusionsIn Political Affairs, 47 Mica. L. REv. 181 (1948) ; BEsT, CoRRTr r PRACricES AT ELEcTioNS (1937).
31. Ex parte Hawthorne, 116 Fla. 608, 156 So. 619 (1934) ; Annot., 96 A.L.R. 582
(1935) ; Annot., 168 A.L.R. 886 (1947) ; but see Ex Parte Harrison, 212 Mo. 88, 110
S.W. 709 (1908).
32. 143 Kan. 315, 55 P.2d 362 (1936).
33. KAi. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1714 (1949).
34. 104 Ohio St. 167, 135 N.E. 525 (1922).
35. OHIo REv. CODE § 3599.09 (1960).
36. Commonwealth v. Acquaviva, 187 Pa. Super. 550, 145 A.2d 407, 412 (1958)
(The quotation is from the opinion of the Court of Quarter Sessions of Lawrence
County, upon which opinion the judgment was affirmed. The opinion is not reprinted
in the official report).
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reference to which the legislature may act and whether the states' purposes in enacting the statutes justify the restraint upon free speech.
The statute in the Freenancase is limited to critical comments about
political candidates. The state has a vital interest in the integrity of
elections. Also, there is a strong argument for prohibiting anonymous
irresponsible charges in election campaigns, since the time element might
not permit the charges to be refuted by truth. But the statute in the
Babst case is limited only in the sense that it applies to election publications. It could apply to an advertisement saying only, "vote for the best
man." It is probable that a statute as broad as the Ohio statute exceeds
the scope of legitimate state interest and comes within the ban of Talley
and Shelton.
Another area in which anonymity has been denied is that of lobbying before Congress. The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act 3 requires any person engaged in lobbying as defined by the Act to give his
name and address (and those of his employer) to officers of the Senate
38 this requirement was
and the House. In United States v. Harriss
upheld against arguments that it violated first amendment guarantees of
free speech and right to petition the government. The Court paid little
attention to the alleged restraint upon free speech, stating: "But, even
assuming some such deterrent effect, the restraint is at most an indirect
one resulting from self-censorship. . . . The hazard of such restraint
is too remote to require striking down . . . (the) statute. . .. ""

The self-censorship discounted in Harrissis the very restraint which
the Court later found in Talley, Slhelton, NAACP and Bates would discourage the exercise of free speech and association. The indirectness of
the restraint does not make it remote, nor does it end inquiry into the
violation of first amendment guarantees." Since the Harrisscase limited
the disclosure requirement to paid lobbyists communicating directly with
members of Congress, 4 the Act should be distinguishable from the ordinance in Talley. Justification for the subordination of free speech can
be seen in the necessity to maintain the integrity of the legislative process,
allowing legislators to ascertain the source of the pressures to which they
are subjected.
37. 60 Stat. 841 (1946), 2 U.S.C. § 269 (1958). Several states have enacted
statutes similar to the Federal Act; see, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 34-301 (Burns 1949);
ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 63, § 110 (Smith-Hurd 1959); MIcHi. STAT. ANN. § 2.601 (1952).
38. 347. U.S. 612 (1954).
39. Id. at 626.
40. American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
41.

347 U.S. 612, 623 (1954).
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Congressional investigations frequently involve the required disclosure of individuals' political beliefs and associations. The primary question here is whether there is a first amendment right to refuse to disclose
one's beliefs and associations without being subjected to a citation for
contempt or a prosecution under the federal criminal statute which makes
refusal to answer pertinent questions a misdemeanor. 2
It is not disputed that there are limitations upon the congressional
power of investigation.43 The fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination has long been recognized as a limitation,4 4 and the due
process clause of the fifth amendment requires that a witness be informed
of the subject matter under inquiry and the pertinency of questions to
that subject matter.42 Courts have repeatedly admitted that the first
amendment limits congressional investigations,46 but the manner in which
the limitations operate is usually avoided by deciding on other grounds.47
The main arguments for and against a freedom from compelled disclosure have arisen in connection with investigations before the House
Un-American Activities Committee. Early in the history of the Committee, arguments were advanced that exposure was an effective and
valid means for combatting subversion,48 and statements of some members of the Committee indicated that exposure was regarded as the primary purpose of the Committee.49 Counter-arguments maintained that
exposure-for-exposure's sake was unconstitutional and that the government could not punish by publicity where it could not punish by other
means.60
Although exposure has been discounted as a proper legislative purpose,"' individuals' rights to remain anonymous in their political beliefs
42. 52 Stat. 942 (1938), 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1958).
43. See Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880); Sinclair v. United States,
279 U.S. 263 (1928); see generally Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 H.uAv. L. REV. 153 (1926).
44. See Councilman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892); Quinn v. United States,
349 U.S. 155 (1955).
45. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
46. See United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953); Watkins v. United States,
354 U.S. 178 (1957).
47. See Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955) (decided on fifth amendment
grounds).
48. See To SEcumn THESE RIGHTS: REPORT OF THE PRESmENT'S COMMirrTE ON
CIVIL RIGHTS (1947).
49. See, e.g., a statement of Committee Chairman Martin Dies: "I am not in a
position to say whether we can legislate effectively concerning this matter, but I do

know that exposure in a democracy is the most effective weapon we have." 83 CoNc.
REC. 7570 (1938) ; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 163 (1959) (Appendix to
dissenting opinion which quotes similar statements).
50. See BARTH, THE LOYALTY OF FREE MEN, 49-173 (1951) ; CHAFEE, THE BLESsINGS OF LIBERTY 179-235 (1956).
51. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
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and associations have received little recognition, as long as fifth amendment procedures are observed by the Committee. Barenblatt v. United
States"2 affirmed a conviction for defendant's refusal to testify as to
whether he had been a member of the Communist Party. The Court
recognized that "the first amendment in some instances protects an individual from being compelled to disclose his associational relationships""
but held that the balance between the defendant's rights and the government's interest in national security was in the government's favor. 4
Similar development has occurred with state investigation of subversive activities. In Sweezy v. New Hampshire,55 investigation into a
professor's knowledge of the Progressive Party and into the content of
his lectures was held not to be within the vague authorizing resolution
of the legislature. 6 There was no opinion of the Court, but the two
opinions representing the majority agreed that the questions were an invasion of political privacy and academic freedom." In Uphaus v. Wyma the Court affirmed a conviction for refusal to produce the guest
list of persons attending a political discussion camp. The record showed
that many of the speakers at the camp had connections with the Communist Party or with organizations on the Attorney-General's list and
that defendant had participated in Communist-front activities." On this
basis the Court held that the state's interest in self-preservation outweighed any individual interest in associational privacy.
In both Sweezy and Uphaus a right of anonymity was recognized,
but in Uphaus the Court did not analyze the government's interest with
any stringency before weighing it against the right of anonymity. Four
members of the Court dissented in a strong opinion, asserting that the
state showed no interest sufficient to subordinate the defendant's constitutional rights and that the state was exposing merely for the sake of
exposure."
Certainly the state's showing of Communist-front and
52. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
53. Id. at 126.
54. In Wilkinson v. United States, 29 U.S.L. WE:E 4201 -(U.S. Feb. 27, 1961), and
Braden v. United States, 29 U.S.L. WEEK 4201 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1961), the Supreme Court
affirmed convictions under 2 U.S.C. § 192 for refusals to answer questions concerning
Communist affiliations before the Committee. Petitioners' refusals to answer were based
upon the first amendment, but the Court held the claims were indistinguishable from
those decided in the Barenblatt case.
55. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
56. N.H. Laws 1953, c. 307; N.H. Laws 1955, c. 197 (continuing for two years the
authority granted in 1953).

57. 354 U.S. 234, 250, 262 (1957).
58. 360 U.S. 72 (1959), rehearingdenied, 361 U.S. 856 (1959), appeal dismissed, 364
U.S. 388 (1960).
59. 360 U.S. 72, 79 (1959).
60. Id. at 82.
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Attorney-General's list connections, without more, makes it difficult to
see that New Hampshire's self-preservation was at stake. Further, the
authority to investigate subversion was not renewed in the 1957 session
of the legislature, casting some doubts upon the weight of the state's
interest.",
The Upiaus case is a good example of the difficulty of maintaining
a proper standard in the area of free speech and association. Recognizing that Communism in the sense of advocacy of violent overthrow of
the government is a great threat to national security, 2 it does not necessarily follow that a mere connection with a Communist-front organization (which is by definition removed from Communist-action) 6 3 implies
a threat of destruction so imminent that constitutional rights may be
subordinated. Therefore, the balance between governmental and individual interests cannot be struck unless the conflicting interests are first
examined and evaluated with care. 4
Turning from investigation to legislation regarding subversion, we
may examine certain disclosure requirements enacted in the Subversive
Activities Control Act of 1950.65 The Act established a Subversive
Activities Control Board (S.A.C.B.), which has the duty of determining,
upon petition of the Attorney-General, whether an organization is a
Communist-front or Communist-action organization within the Act's
definitions. 6
Communist-action organizations are required to register with the
Attorney-General and file with him the names and addresses of their
61. Uphaus v. Wyman, 364 U.S. 388 (1960).
62. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
63. A communist-action organization is: any organization in the United States ...
which (i) is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by the foreign government
or foreign organization controlling the world communist movement . . . and (ii) operates primarily to advance the objectives of such world communist movement. . . .
Subversive Activities Control Act, 64 Stat. 989 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 782 (3) (a) (1958).
A Communist-front organization is: any organization in the United States . . . which
(A) is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by a Communist-action organization, and (B) is primarily operated for the purpose of giving aid and support to a
Communist-action organization. . . . 64 Stat. 989 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 782 (4) (1958).
64. Although the varying importance of the "individual interest" has not been
considered to the same extent as the varying importance of "government interest," it
may be argued that a right of anonymity is especially vital in some situations, such as
elections. Further, Mr. Justice Black argues that it is not merely the interest of an individual defendant which must be weighed, but rather, "the interest of the people as a
whole in being able to join organizations, advocate causes and make political 'mistakes'
without later being subjected to governmental penalties for having dared to think for
themselves." Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 144 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
65. 64 Stat. 987 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 781-98 (1958). See 68 Stat. 776 (1954), 50
U.S.C. § 843 (1958), which makes the Subversive Activities Control Act applicable to
the Communist Party.
66. See the definitions at note 63 supra.
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officers and members.67 Both Communist-front and Communist-action
organizations are required to label any publications sent through the
mails or transmitted in interstate commerce with the phrase, "Dissemi, a Communist organization."6 8
nated by
The Supreme Court has not yet passed upon the constitutionality of
the Act, although the issue with reference to the registration provisions
should be decided in this term. The S.A.C.B. designated the Communist
party of the United States as a Communist-action organization, and after
years of litigation 9 the constitutional issues were finally argued in this

term."0
The emergence of anonymity as an aspect of free speech and free
association provides arguments against the constitutionality of portions
of the Act, in particular the labeling provisions. The registration requirement for Communist-action organizations restrains free association,
but it can be upheld since the definition of Communist-action organization is sufficiently limited71 and the government's interest in national
security sufficiently strong that the balance should be found in favor of
the government."2 The labeling provisions of the Act, however, are less
defensible on constitutional grounds. They are broader in application,
applying also to Communist-front organizations, where the threat to national security is not as imminent as it is with Communist-action
organizations.
But the major defect in the labeling provisions is that they apply to
"all publications""3 without distinction on the basis of content. The first
amendment permits legislative restraint upon some speech but not restraint upon all speech merely because the speaker is associated with Communism. 4 Therefore, it would appear that the labeling provisions might
fall within the ban of the Talley decision as a broad restraint of all publications, not limited to specific evils (e.g., publications directed toward
promoting the Communist conspiracy) against which the government is
empowered to legislate.
67. 64 Stat. 993 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 786 (1958).
68. 64 Stat. 996 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 789 (1958).
69. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board,
223 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd. 351 U.S. 115, remanded to S.A.C.B. 254 F.2d 314 (D.C.
Cir.), S.A.C.B. order affd. 277 F.2d 78 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted 361 U.S. 951 (1960).
70. 29 U.S.L. WEEK 3110 (U.S. Oct. 11-12, 1960) (No. 12).

71. See note 63 supra.
72. See Sutherland, Freedom and Internal Security, 64 HARv. L. REv. 383 (1951);
but see Note, 46 GEo. L.J. 299 (1958).
73. Supra note 68.
74. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1936).

NOTES
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has recognized anonymity as an aspect of free
speech and association which is entitled to protection in some circumstances. Further, in dealing with excessively broad statutes the Court
has considered anonymity as a fundamental right regardless of circumstances. The scope of protection of anonymity remains to be seen, since
the cases recognizing it have involved statutes which were excessively
broad or disclosure requirements not reasonably related to the purposes
they were asserted to serve.
The main problem in applying the precedents of Talley and Shelton
will be the determination of when a disclosure requirement is sufficiently
specific to avoid unconstitutionality. It is suggested that merely limiting
the requirement to a broad class, such as election publications or publications distributed by certain groups, does not satisfy the requirement.
Another question to be resolved is the character of the right. The
more recent cases concerning legislative investigations have admitted that
anonymity in political beliefs and associations is a first amendment right,
although the governmental interests were held to outweigh the right. The
Shelton case shows that the Court will take notice that anonymity is essential in some circumstances, but only in the Talley case has the Court
protected anonymity without considering the circumstances.
The real importance of anonymity as a fundamental right must depend upon the scope of its protection. Where the government has no
legitimate interest, the NAACP and Bates cases show that anonymity
will be protected. But perhaps the right will be tested most in the area
of government investigations and legislation concerning political beliefs
and associations. Here the government has a vital interest in the protection of national security, but here individuals also have a vital interest
in their first and fourteenth amendment rights. The scope of protection of anonymity will be decided, then, by the stringency with which the
Supreme Court examines the conflicting interests before striking the
balance.

CIVIL RIGHTS ACT SECTION 1983: ABUSES BY LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS
Prior to 1866, the "individual" rights of a person were given only
limited protection by the federal constitution. Such rights were protected from federal infringement, but were not protected from abridge-
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ment by state conduct. The Civil War, the emancipation issues involved
therein, and the subsequent nationalistic era of the Abolitionists resulted
in a great change in the constitutional framework of individual rights.
The change was brought about by the extensive "civil rights"' legislation
produced by the congressional civil rights program (1865-75).
This
legislation, known as the "Civil Rights Acts," constituted a major part
of the Civil War reconstruction legislation.2
The Fourth Civil Rights Act,' section 1 of which was later to become section 1983,' was passed on April 20, 1871. The purpose of this
act was to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment, pursuant
to section 5 of that amendment which grants Congress the power to enforce its provisions by appropriate legislation. Soon after their enactment, the Civil Rights Acts and the fourteenth amendment, from which
most of the civil rights legislation drew its vitality, underwent a period of
severe judicial interpretation.' The period culminated with the decisions
handed down in The SlaughterhouseCase,' United States v. Cruikshank,
1. A distinction exists between the basic concepts of "civil liberties" and "civil
rights." "Civil liberties" are those rights which the Constitution puts beyond the power
of state or federal governments to abridge in any way; "civil rights," on the other
hand, are rights protected against state action with supplementary enforcement powers
granted to the federal government. "Civil liberties" have as a source the original Constitution and the Bill of Rights. "Civil rights" date back only to the later, post-Civil
War, amendments to the Constitution. Storey, Commission on Civil Rights, 46 A.B.AJ.
39, 41 n. 16 (1960).
2. The congressional civil rights program produced three amendments to the Constitution (thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth) and five supplementary congressional
statutes (the Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1867, 1870, 1871, and 1875).
3. 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
4. REV. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958).
5. Concerning the judicial decimation of the civil rights legislation passed pursuant to the three Civil War constitutional amendments, see CARR, FEDERAL PROTEcTION OF
CIVIL RIGHTs 40-46 (1947).
6. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). This case concerned the fourteenth amendment
and a Louisiana law which created a monopoly in a single corporation for slaughtering
animals. The court upheld the monopoly grant, saying that the privilege of engaging
in the lawful business of slaughtering animals was not a privilege protected by the
fourteenth amendment from state abridgement. Of much greater significance was the
judicial construction given to the privileges and immunities clause. Justice Miller,
speaking for the majority, said that only national citizenship received protection from
the privileges and immunities clause and that national citizenship did not comprehend
any of the fundamental rights of the individual. He concluded that since such fundamental rights adhered only to state citizenship, they were not protected by the privileges
and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment from state abridgement.
7. 92 U.S. 542 (1875). In this case, the Court applied the Slaiwhterhouse doctrine
directly to an alleged violation of a Negro's fundamental right to assemble. The Court
held that the right to assemble peacefully is not a necessary attribute of national citizenship unless it is directly related in some way to the functions of the federal government, such as assembling for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of
grievances. Cruikshank thus limited the civil rights legislation of Congress in the same
way that the Slaughterhouse Case had limited the fourteenth amendment. The end result was that the civil rights legislation, enacted under congressional power to enforce
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and the Civil Rights Cases.' These cases dealt a death blow to much of
the civil rights legislation,9 and placed restrictions on the fourteenth
amendment which still remain."0
Although relatively dormant until the last twenty years, section
1983" has remained on the books in almost the same form as when
originally enacted. 2 Section 1983 gives a federal cause of action 3 in law
or equity 4 to every person 5 for a deprivation, under color of state law,
the fourteenth amendment by appropriate legislation, was valid only to the extent of
the limited relationship existing between the citizen and the federal government.

8. 109 U.S. 3, 15 (1883).

The Civil Rights Act of 1875, which made it a crime

for one person to deprive another of equal accommodations at inns, theatres, or public
conveyances was found to exceed the powers conferred on Congress by the thirteenth
and fourteenth amendments, and hence to be an unlawful invasion of the powers reserved to the states by the tenth amendment.
9. In 1873 the Civil Rights Acts incurred additional restrictions when all federal
laws were recodified and published as the Revised Statutes (1873). In 1894 most of the
provisions relating to suffrage rights were repealed by the Act of Feb. 8, 1894, 28 Stat.
36. Still other civil rights provisions disappeared with the enactment of the Federal
Criminal Code in 1909, 35 Stat. 1092 (1909).
10. For extensive developments of the history of civil rights legislation, see KoNVITZ, THE CONSTITUTION AND CIVL RiGHTS (1947); Note, The Civil Rights Act:
Emergence of an; Adequate Federal Civil Remedy?, 26 IND. L.J. 361 (1951) ; Gressman,
The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MicEr. L. REv. 1323 (1952).
11. "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress." Rav. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958). Other Civil Rights Acts
discussed in this note are 17 Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1958), which provides a civil action against a conspiracy to deprive a person of his rights; 18 U.S.C.
§ 242 (1958), which is a criminal code counterpart of § 1983; 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1958),
which is in general a criminal code counterpart of § 1985(3).
12. The expansive words "and laws" were added to the language of § 1983 by
REi. STAT. § 1979 (1875). The purpose was to enable § 1983 to embrace rights and privileges created by congressional act in addition to those rights granted by the Constitution. The addition resulted in little substantive consequence until given judicial acknowledgement in Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 825
(1947). Judge Learned Hand held that rights secured by the "laws" (as well as the
Constitution) of the United States are protected by § 1983. The Bomar decision is extensively discussed in 16 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 260 (1947) ; 43 ILL. L. Rv. 105 (1948);
and 60 HAlw. L. REv. 1346 (1947).
13. Neither diversity of citizenship nor a jurisdictional amount in controversy is
required for federal court jurisdiction. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person: . . .
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any state law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution
of the United States or by any act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or
of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1958).
14. See Valle v. Stengel, 176 F.2d 697 (3d Cir. 1949) (both an injunction and
damages are permissible in the same action).
15. "Every person" has been held to include the administration of the estate of
one who died as a result of tortious conduct by a police officer which constituted a cause
of action under § 1983. Davis v. Johnson, 138 F. Supp. 572 (N.D. Ill. 1955). But see
the textual discussion concerning immunities, infra.
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of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the federal constitution or laws of the United States.'
The present discussion is limited to the application of section 1983
as a federal civil remedy for tortious deprivations of civil rights resulting
from illegal search, false arrest, false imprisonment, incommunicado detention, and police brutality.'
Police "abuses" of the above delineated
16. It has been contended that § 1983 does not give a cause of action against a
"conspiracy" to deprive an individual of his civil rights. See Eaton v. Bibb, 217 F.2d
446 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 915 (1955); Jennings v. Nester, 217 F.2d 153
(7th Cir. 1954). The rationale of this view is based on the assertion that § 1983 and
17 Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1958), of the Civil Rights Acts should be
treated in pari materia. (Section 1985(3), similar to § 1983, provides a cause of action
against the members of a civil conspiracy to deprive one of his civil rights). It is reasoned under the pari materia approach that since § 1985(3) specifically concerns itself
with conspiracy, § 1983 (which does not specifically mention conspiracy) does not give
a cause of action against a conspiracy. If this contention is correct, it appears, because
of the questionable constitutional validity of § 1985(3), that the Civil Rights Acts do
not provide an effective remedy against a civil conspiracy. The criminal counterpart
of § 1985(3), 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1958) (also originating from the Civil Rights Acts of
1871), was declared unconstitutional in United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882),
due to the fact that its language does not contain the "state action" element necessary
for violation of the fourteenth amendment. Section 1985(3) is deficient in the same
respect. In addition, the Supreme Court decision in Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S.
651, 659 (1951), although decided on other issues, constituted a judicial declaration of
the unconstitutionality of § 1985(3). See generally Poole, Remledies for Protection of
Civil Rights, 32 ORE. L. REv. 210, 227-30 (1952-53), which reaches the same conclusion.
Section 1985(3) has been sustained as a valid remedy in only two reported cases, McShane v. Moldovan, 172 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1949), and Wakat v. Harlib, 253 F.2d 59
(7th Cir. 1958). It is significant that in both cases the defense counsel failed to raise the
constitutional issue. (Wakat 'v. Harlib was also a § 1983 action-10,000 damages were
awarded under § 1985(3) and $5,000 under § 1983).
If § 1985(3) is assumed to be unconstitutional, it is seen that the only way to bring
a successful civil conspiracy action under the Civil Rights Acts is to bring it under
§ 1983. This is precisely what was done in the recent case of Hoffman v. Holden, 268
F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1959). The court in Hoffman held that the civil injury which results
from action taken pursuant to a civil conspiracy constitutes the cause of action, and if
such injury is within the protection of § 1983, those who conspire or cooperate to produce the injury are equally liable (under the joint tort-feasor concept) under § 1983.
This view requires a tortious overt act causing a deprivation of rights, not just the
element of a conspiracy, as in a criminal conspiracy.

See PMuINS, CRImiNAI. LAW 531

(1957). For a discussion which agrees that § 1983 should not be limited by being read
in pari materia with § 1985(3), see Comment, Civil Rights-Due Process-Action for
Civil Conspiracy Based on Section 1983, 58 MICu. L. REV. 786 (1959-60).
17. Although this note is primarily concerned with § 1983 as a federal civil remedy
for "police abuse" deprivations of civil rights, it must not be overlooked that § 1983
can be a very effective remedy in other areas of civil rights and civil liberties deprivations. The injunctive remedy available under § 1983 has been very successful in the
area of first amendment freedoms in conjunction with the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment. E.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). For a general discussion of § 1983 as an effective safeguard against state infringement of first
amendment rights, property rights, suffrage rights, and state action deprivations of
rights through discrimination or judicial proceedings, see Note, The Civil Rights Act:
Emergence of an Adequate Federal Remedy?, 26 IND. L.J. 361 (1950-51). Concerning
the effectiveness of 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1958) (the criminal sanction partner of § 1983),
which can be a very successful government action under the same facts as would constitute a § 1983 civil cause of action, see Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1950)
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type are believed to be a common occurrence in our society; each day in
our large cities there are large numbers of illegal arrests and illegal imprisonments, often accompanied by severe police brutality.18 The need
for a federal civil remedy with which to recover damages for the injuries
caused by police misconduct depends primarily on the availability and adequacy of the remedies afforded by the state courts. State civil remedies
for police "abuses" consist of the common law actions of trespass, false
arrest, and false imprisonment. The latter two remedies are usually unrewarding, while trespass as a remedy for illegal search and seizure has
been described as "completely impotent." 19 Reliance on state criminal
prosecution (under state law) of the offending officer offers little
promise. A prosecutor in all except the most flagrant cases is unlikely
to imperil his relations with the police by such action. The advantages
to be gained through the existence of an adequate federal statutory civil
remedy, such as section 1983, include an improvement in the measure of
damages,2" relief from strict common law legal requirements, and trial
before a forum free from local or municipal administrative pressures. 2'
Recent section 1983 litigation has proved that a federal forum, combined with an adequate federal statute, can provide a realistic remedy for
"police abuse" deprivations of civil rights.2" Many federal courts, however have continued to interpret section 1983 narrowly, and to treat the
(conviction of three police officers and a private detective under § 242); Koehler v.
United States, 189 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1951). See also Comment, State Police, Ulconstitutionally Obtained Evidence and Section 242 of the Civil Rights Statutes, 7 STAN. L.
Rxv. 76 (1954-55) ; Clark, A Federal Prosecutor Looks at the Civil Rights Statutes, 47

COLU.
18.
152-54
Plumb,

L. REv. 175 (1947).
See generally Hall, Police and Law i a Democratic Society, 28 INn. LJ. 133,
(1953) ; Warner, Investigating the Law of Arrest, 26 A.B.A.J. 151 (1940);
Illegal Enforcement of the Law, 24 CoRNELL L.Q. 337 (1939) ; HoPKINs, OUR
LAWLESS POLICE (1931).
19. Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L.
REv. 493, 98 (1954-55). For full discussion and representative cases supporting the
writer's conclusion of the inadequacy of state common law remedies, see generally Foote,
supra at 496-504; the articles listed supra note 18; Comment, 10 STAN. L. Riv. 347, 352
n. 23 (1958) ; Hall, The Law of Arrest in Relation to Contemporary Social Problems,
3 U. CHI. L.REv. 345, 346-353 (1936).
20.

Concerning damages obtainable under § 1983, see infra note 31.

21. Regardless of the existence or non-existence of advantages, or of the adequacy or inadequacy of the common law remedies, the Supreme Court, in a § 1983
damage action, has clearly held federal jurisdiction to exist independently of any state
remedies, statutory or otherwise. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 294 (1939). Romero
v. Weakley, 226 F.2d 399, 401 (9th Cir. 1955) stated that "the obvious purpose of the
civil rights legislation is to give the litigant his choice of a federal forum rather than
that of a state." Accord, Burt v. City of New York, 156 F.2d 791, 793 (2d Cir. 1946).
See also the language in Monroe v. Pape, 81 S. Ct. 473, 482 (1961): "The federal
remedy is supplementary to the State and the State remedy need not be first sought and
refused .. "
22. E.g., Wakat v. Harlib, 253 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1958) ($15,000 damages awarded);
Jackson v. Duke, 259 F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1958) ($5,000 damages awarded).
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cases arising thereunder very restrictively; the result has been that "police
abuse" litigation under section 1983 often has proved to be an unrewarding undertaking.2 3
An analysis of police abuse cases in which section 1983 has been
denied as a remedy results in a delineation of three major legal issues
which have prevented the emergence of the section as an adequate civil
remedy."' These issues are as follows: (1) Which specific individual
rights are secured to persons by the "Constitution and laws," an abridgement of such rights which will then constitute a possible cause of action
under section 1983? (2) What is the proper scope of section 1983 in
relation to the current judicial concepts of federalism, i.e., to what extent is it "proper" for federal courts to interfere with and exercise control over state law enforcement? (3) Assuming its validity as a civil
remedy, does section 1983 authorize an abrogation of the common law
"official" and "governmental" immunities from tort liability and if so,
to what extent?
23. Stift v. Lynch, 267 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1959) ; Jennings v. Nestor, 217 F.2d 153
(7th Cir. 1954); Simmons v. Whittaker, 252 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1958); Mackey v.
Chandler, 152 F. Supp. 579 (4th Cir. 1957) ; Dineen v. Williams, 219 F.2d 428 (9th Cir.
1955).
24. Surprisingly, the issue which caused the Court the most difficulty in the recent
case of Monroe v. Pape, 81 S. Ct. 473 (1961) was the question of what constitutes
"state action," i.e., when is an act done under the "color of state law" as required by §
1983? Justice Frankfurter's position in his dissenting opinion in Monroe was that if the
conduct was done in violation of state law, then the actor has abused his powers to the
extent that he has dislodged his cloak of state authority, and thus his unlawful conduct
was not done under "color of law." See also Simmons v. Whittaker, 252 F.2d 224, 229
(5th Cir. 1958). The majority in Monroe approved the often quoted position that the
conduct of a police officer constitutes state action (under color of state law) if it is a
"misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the
wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law." United States v. Classic, 313
U.S. 229, 326 (1941) ; approved in Monroe v. Pape, supra. See also Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 776 (1945). Such conduct
is under color of state law even though it is contrary to or in excess of authority granted
under state law, or even though the state law is invalid. See Baldwin v. Morgan, 251
F.2d 780, 786 (5th Cir. 1958). In litigation involving 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1958) (the
criminal counterpart of § 1983), it has been clearly established that the conduct of a
police officer, even if in direct violation of state law, is action under "color of state
law." See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951).
An interesting development concerning the "color of law" concept is whether or not
a private person, as opposed to a state official, may be held liable under § 1983. Against
such a contention is the decision in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875),
which at 555 held that the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment consisted exclusively of restrictions upon the states and that it does not ". . . add
anything to the rights which one citizen has under the Constitution against another."
Three years later, the Court restated its position when it held "the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution . . . all have reference to state action exelusively, and not to any action of private individuals." Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S.
313, 318 (1879).
Notwithstanding such strong language by the Supreme Court, the conduct of private
individuals and private corporations has been held by lower federal courts to be capable

NOTES
THE RIGHTS PROTECTED

The scope of protection afforded to individual rights by section 1983
is clearly dependent on the interpretation of the phrase found therein,
"the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws.""2 Justice Stone in Hague v. CIO expressed the
view that section 1983:
extends broadly to deprivation by state action of the rights,
privileges and immunities secured to persons by the Constitution. It thus includes the fourteenth amendment and such privileges and immunities as are secured by the due process and
equal protection clauses, as well as by the privileges and immunities clause of that amendment."
of bringing such persons under the "color of law" concept. The common factor always
present in such results is that the "individuals" have been vested with, or have assumed,
the cloak of law enforcement authority, and then have abused their pseudo-authority in
such a manner as to deprive another of his civil rights. The most prevalent fact situation involves a private person acting jointly with state officers, the action of the private
person thereby becoming "state action." See McShane v. Moldovan, 172 F.2d 1016 (6th
Cir. 1949) ; Valle v. Stengel, 176 F.2d 697 (3d Cir. 1949) (private transportation corporation and manager of same held liable for directing a police officer to enforce discrimination in waiting rooms); Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1950) (conviction of private detective under 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1958) ; Culp v. United States, 131 F.2d
93 (8th Cir. 1942) (conviction of private attorney under 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1958)). It
is to be noted that results of this type are closely akin to the "aider and abbettor" conspiracy action discussed at note 16 supra.
25. REv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958).
26. 307 U.S. 496, 526 (1939) (concerned the right to assemble to discuss the National Labor Relations Act. Justice Stone held that freedom of speech and freedom of
assembly were rights secured to persons by the due process clause, and that § 1983 afforded a means of relief in a federal court for state abridgement of such rights).
There is a line of cases which support the view that § 1983 does not give a tort
cause of action for a denial of equal protection. See McShane v. Moldovan, 172 F.2d
1016 (6th Cir. 1949) ; Ortega v. Ragen, 216 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1954). The cases reach
this result by applying the same in par materia treatment to §§ 1983 and 1985(3) of the
Civil Rights Acts as is discussed in note 16 supra (§ 1985(3) specifically mentions the
words "equal protection" and § 1983 does not). That this view is not in the majority
was confirmed by the recent Hoffman v. Holden, note 16 supra. Concerning equal
protection, Hoffman held that regardless of § 1985(3), the broad language of § 1983
embraces all of § 1 of the fourteenth amendment, including denials of equal protection. In accord with Hoffnman is Agnew v. City of Compton, 239 F.2d 226 (9th
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 959 (1957). For an early discussion of the subject
which reached the same conclusion, see Poole, Remedies for Protection of Civil Rights,
32 ORE. L. REv. 210, 218-22 (1952-53).
Even though § 1983 is said to include a cause of action for a denial of equal protection, there are other obstacles present which are likely to greatly affect the successfulness of such an action. One is the doctrine concerning equal protection expressed by
Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944). There the Court, in an action brought under
§§ 1981, 1983 and 1985(3), said that the state action must contain an element of "purposeful discrimination" in order to constitute a violation of equal protection. For a
discussion of this doctrine and of the conflicting results reached in its application by
the courts, see Note, The Proper Scope of the Civil Rights Acts, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1285,
1293-95 (1953).
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The most pressing obstacle to the emergence of section 1983 as an
adequate remedy is the unsteady and often contradictory approach taken
by the federal courts in regard to the question of which basic personal
rights and immunities are secured by the Constitution and laws of the
United States, and are thus within the protective shell of the fourteenth
amendment.2 7 One federal court, entertaining a section 1983 action
has said:
The fact that a prisoner is assaulted, injured, or even murdered
by state officials does not necessarily mean that he is deprived
of any right protected or secured by the Constitution or laws
of the United States.28
While another has said:
The due process covenant of the Constitution of the United
States avouches plaintiff's right to be free of arrest save on
probable cause, it assures him the right to be at liberty, to be
imprisoned only for cause, and it secures his right to personal
safety while in the hands of his jailor.29
A second and more serious obstacle arises when a court reasons, as did the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals in Jennings v. Nestor, 217 F.2d 153, 154 (7th Cir. 1954) (action under §8 1983 and 1985(3) ) : "The complaint clearly does not state a cause of action for a denial of equal protection. Although it alleges improper acts on the part of
the defendants, there is nothing to indicate that every citizen of Illinois is not potentially
subject to the same treatment." Such a showing would obviously be extremely difficult
to make.
27. For a list of individual rights the courts have held to be beyond the protection
of the fourteenth amendment, see CoRwIN, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNrITED STATES OF
See generally, KONViTZ, THE CONSTITUTION AND CIVIL RIGHTS
AmERCA, 969 (1952).
(1947).
28. Simmons v. Whittaker, 252 F.2d 224, 231 (5th Cir. 1958).
29. Dye v. Cox, 125 F. Supp. 714, 715 (D.C. Va. 1954), citing Catlette v. United
States, 132 F.2d 902, 906 (4th Cir. 1943). Dye v. Cox resulted in a dismissal of plaintiff's complaint because the court required that an element of purposefulness on the
part of the defendant be alleged before the deprivation constitutes a cause of action
under § 1983. The Dye court erroneously cited Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944)
as authority for its doctrine of "purposefulness." Snowden applied the "purposeful"
doctrine only to equal protection under § 1985 of the Civil Rights Acts, not to § 1983.
A more important aspect of this problem is raised by the "specific intent" doctrine
of Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). Screws concerned a federal conviction
of a Georgia sheriff, who beat his Negro prisoner to death, under the criminal counterpart of § 1983, 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1958). Section 242, like § 1983, forbids violation of
"rights

. .

. secured ...

by the Constitution, .

.

." Unlike § 1983, § 242 requires that the

violation be "wilful." The Court in Screws read the word "wilful" as requiring a "specific intent" to deprive a person of a civil right before a conviction could be sustained
under § 242. If §§ 242 and 1983 were to be considered as in par i ateria concerning the
requirement of wilfulness, then the "purposefulness" doctrine expressed by Dye would
seem to be valid. It seems erroneous to impose the strict criminal standard laid down
in Screws to § 1983 litigation. The fifth amendment objections to § 242, which led to
the restrictive holding in Screws, are not applicable to § 1983 because it is a civil and
not a criminal statute. "The standards of certainty in statutes punishing for offense
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With such diverse opinions among the federal courts, it is no surprise
that two plaintiffs, having suffered approximately the same degree of
physical abuse from the police, can obtain diametrically opposed results
under section 1983 merely because they bring their action in different
federal circuits.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held in Jackson v.
Duke" that plaintiff's complaint of conduct by San Antonio city police
officers which included assaulting plaintiff, beating him, arresting him
without a warrant, illegally searching and stealing from him, and illegally
imprisoning him, stated a valid cause of action under section 1983. Five
thousand dollars in damages were held not excessive."' In a bizarre contrast, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held in Monroe v. Pape32 that
are higher than in those depending primarily upon civil sanction for enforcement."
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948). After carefully analyzing the Screws
case, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d
240, 249, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 776 (1945), that § 1983 cannot be held too vague to meet
the test of the fifth amendment because it does not refer to the state of mind of the
defendant tort-feasor. See Note, 7 BAYLOR L. PEv. 224, 231-32 (1955). The Supreme
Court in Monroe v. Pape, 81 S. Ct. 473, 484 (1961) so held:
We do not think that gloss should be placed on . . . [§ 1983] which we have
here. The word wilfully does not appear in . . . [§ 1983]. Moreover, . . .
[§ 1983] provides a civil remedy, while in the Screws case we dealt with a
criminal law. .

.

. Section . . . [1983] should be read against the background

of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of
his actions.
30. 259 F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1958).
31. An important aspect of the effectiveness of § 1983 concerns damages obtainable under the act. Help in this area was originally provided by Hague v. CIO, 101
F.2d 774, 789 (3d Cir.), modified, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); where it was stated that an
action under § 1983 sounds in tort, that there can be exemplary damages, and that the
measure of damages is "the value of the civil rights of which the appellees were deprived in the past and which are threatened with loss in the future." A problem exists
in trying to evaluate rights and immunities on a money basis. This problem however
would seem to be no more difficult than is the evaluation of damages in other areas of
tort liability. Much help may be gained by reference to the common law actions in the
state courts. Actual damages may be nominal in the type of tortious acts with which
we are concerned, and state courts have held that exemplary damages may be recovered
where the defendant acted maliciously or where his conduct was gross or wanton. See
generally, 56 C.J. 1254 n. 64, 69 and cases there cited. Since damages for humiliation,
reputation, and right of privacy would probably be greatly affected by the standing of
the plaintiff in his community, it has been suggested (with the "underdog" of society
in mind-as one who is most vulnerable to having his civil rights deprived and least
likely to prove actual damages) that liquidated damages should be provided. See Foote,
Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MIN'N. L. Rxv. 493, 515

(1954-55).

In any event, the "value" of a constitutional right would seem to be the same for
all, regardless of their financial, social, or moral status. Logically, .the value of a constitutional right would vary with the intensity and extent of the deprivation. See Wakat
v. Harlib, 253 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1958) (plaintiff, under §§ 1983 and 1985, was awarded
$15,000 damages).
32. 272 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1959), reversed, 81 S. Ct. 473 (1961). The principal
authority relied on by the appellate court in Monroe was another Seventh Circuit case,
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plaintiff's complaint of conduct by Chicago city police officers which included breaking, entering, and searching plaintiff's apartment at night
without a warrant; subjecting him and his family to physical brutality;
arresting and imprisoning him without a warrant; and secretly detaining
him without filing a charge against him, did not state a cause of action
under section 1983.
The diverse decisions in Jackson and Monroe do not leave to conjecture what prompted the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to state recently, "there is considerable doubt and confusion in the application of
the Civil Rights Statutes throughout the Circuits." 8 Such doubt and
confusion results in an alarming void of judicial constitutional analysis
in section 1983 cases. If any constitutional reasoning is presented in
the section 1983 decisions, it usually consists of a statement that the individual rights of which plaintiff was deprived are not rights secured by
the Constitution or laws, and thus state action deprivations of such rights
do not constitute a violation of the fourteenth amendment. The reluctance of the courts to go any further in applying recognized constitutional
standards serves to point out the lack of judicial certainty as to specific
delineation of which basic individual rights of a person are within the
protective fold of the fourteenth amendment. In order to stay within the
scope of the present discussion, only the individual rights which are normally subject to police abuse will be considered in regard to their probable
constitutional classification as secured by the federal constitution and
laws and therefore protected by the fourteenth amendment. The specific
personal rights which are most subject to police abuse are the right not
to have one's home or person unreasonably searched, the right not to be
illegally arrested or imprisoned, and freedom from bodily abuse. In
dividual rights such as these are an integral part of the fundamental concept of liberty as defined by our democratic society. These rights are
also basic to the common law, which provides the tort actions of trespass,
false arrest, false imprisonment, and assault and battery. Whether these
rights are federally protected by the fourteenth amendment is not clear.3"
One means whereby these individual rights could gain federal protection from state abridgement would be if they were first protected from
federal abridgement by the Bill of Rights. Then, by means of an incorStift v. Lynch, 267 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1959). For a discussion of Stift v. Lynch, see
notes 101, 104, 105, infra and accompanying text.
33. Hoffman v. Holden, 268 F.2d 280, 289 (9th Cir. 1959).
34. One of the earliest cases to construe § 1983, Brawner v. Irvin, 169 F. 964 (5th
Cir. 1909), held that the language therein which refers to federal rights, privileges, and
immunities did not include the right of an individual to life, liberty, or property, which
.were said to be primary rights within the protection of the states.
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poration of the first eight amendments into the fourteenth amendment, the
desired federal protection could be gained through the due process clause
of that amendment. Certain "rights" granted by and enforced through the
first eight amendments have been enforced against state action through
the fourteenth amendment. Popular examples of such rights are the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and religion which have been upheld
against state encroachment through the fourteenth amendment."5
Whether such protection is given because the first amendment has been
judicially incorporated into the fourteenth amendment, or whether such
freedoms are protected by the fourteenth amendment only because they
are included in the judiciary's concept of which fundamental freedoms
of mankind the vague language of the fourteenth amendment encompasses, is beyond the scope of this note. It is productive however to
survey the "incorporation" possibilities of the specific individual rights
with which this discussion is primarily concerned.
Freedom from Illegal Search,. The right of freedom from illegal

search has gained fourteenth amendment recognition primarily through
the line of cases involving use of evidence in a criminal trial which has
been obtained through an illegal search. 8 The fourth amendment prohibits illegal search and seizure, and the Weeks federal exclusionary rule 7
implements the fourth amendment by excluding evidence from federal
criminal trials which has been illegally obtained by federal officers.
Twenty-four states however, do not prohibit the inclusion of such evidence in their respective tribunals.3 This situation results in two similar
forms of litigation. The first involves the use by a federal prosecutor,
in a federal criminal action, of evidence obtained by state authorities
through an illegal search ;9 the second involves the use of like evidence in
a state criminal action. Concerning the second type of litigation, the
35. E.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (freedom of speech and assembly).
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (freedom of speech and press) ; Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (freedom of religion).
36. See generally, Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, anrd the
Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. REv. 1 (1950).
37. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The Weeks case established an
additional evidentiary rule in that evidence unlawfully seized by state police not acting
under any federal sanction does not have to be excluded from federal criminal trials in
order to satisfy the fourth amendment, because the "Fourth Amendment is not directed
to individual misconduct of such officers." This rule, affirmed in the "silver platter"
decision of Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79 (1949), was recently overruled in
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), and Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253
(1960). Elkins and Rios held that state obtained evidence, if obtained in a manner
which would have violated the fourth amendment if it had been obtained by federal
officers, is inadmissable in a federal criminal trial.
38. For a tabulation of all fifty states and their "exclusion" rules, see the appendix
included in the Elkins case, note 37 supra, at 224.
39. See the discussion, note 37 supra.
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obvious complaint of a plaintiff who has been convicted in a state court
through the use of evidence obtained by an illegal search (and has appealed to a federal court) is that he has been denied his right to due
process in a state court as granted to him by the fourteenth amendment.
The Supreme Court answered this contention in Wolf v. Colorado," holding that the fourteenth amendment does not require the state courts to
adopt the exclusionary rule with respect to evidence illegally seized by
state agents. Such a holding clearly answers the "admissibility of evidence" rule as far as state courts and the fourteenth amendment are concerned; but it does not answer the fourteenth amendment question concerning the illegal search that was used to obtain the evidence."
Confusingly, the opinion in the Wolf case had this to say concerning
illegal search by state officers. in relation to the fourteenth amendment:
"The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the policewhich is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society.
It is therefore implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such
enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause."4 2 This
statement was probably dicta in the Wolf case, but the Supreme Court has
since reiterated the same statement four times.4" A recent case, Elkins v.
United States, concluded that:
nothing could be of greater relevance . . .than the underlying

constitutional doctrine which Wolf established. For there it
was unequivocally determined by a unanimous court that the
Federal Constitution, by virtue of the fourteenth amendment,
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by state officers."
It is significant that when making a statement of the type found in
Wolf and Elkins, the Court has not, except in the recent case of Monroe
v. Pape,4' attempted to make it clear that the fourteenth amendment has
40. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).

41. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the court in Wolf v. Colorado, note 40 supra,
supported his rule concerning state admissibility by stating that most of the English
speaking world does not regard the exclusion of such illegally obtained evidence as
vital to the protection of the right of privacy. What justice Frankfurter did not see

fit to mention is that the constitutions of at least sixty nations contain a clause guaranteeing to its citizens the security of the home and the right not to have his security unreasonably violated. These nations and their constitutional provisions relating to search,
seizure, and the inviolability of the home are set forth in Brief for Petitioners, pp. 84104, Monroe v. Pape, 81 S.Ct. 473 (1961).

42. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 37 (1949).

43. Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 119 (1951) ; Irvine v. California, 347 U.S.
128, 132 (1954); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 362-63 (1959); Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960).
44. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960).
45. 81 S.Ct. 473 (1961). See the textual discussion following note 49 infra.

NOTES
been given such an interpretation because the due process clause has incorporated the guarantees of the fourth amendment. The reluctance of
the court to further extend itself would seem to lend strong support to
the position taken on the subject by Mr. Justice Frankfurter. Speaking
for himself and three other justices in the recent illegal search cases,
Rios v. United States and Elkins v. United States,4" Justice Frankfurter
reiterated the view that "the specific provisions of the first eight amendments are not limitations upon the power of the States or available safeguards of the individual against state authority. 417 He further contended that the "core" of the fourth amendment, and not that amendment
itself, is enforceable against the states through the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. His explanation as to what the "core" of
the fourth amendment refers was seemingly included in his statement,
"some of the principles underlying the specific safeguards of the first
eight amendments are implied limitations upon the States drawn out of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and to that extent, but no more, afford federal protection to individuals against state
power."4
In contrast to the previous reluctance of the Supreme Court to commit itself on the question of whether an unreasonable search violates the
due process clause by reason of an incorporation of the provisions and
guarantees, as opposed to the underlying principles, of the fourteenth
49
amendment, the Court recently stated in Monroe v. Pape
that:

Allegation of facts constituting a deprivation under color of
state authority of a right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment satisfies . . . the requirement of . . . [§ 1983]. *** For

the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures contained in the Fourth Amendment has been made applicable to
the States by reason of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."0
Although Justice Frankfurter"' did not specifically take issue with the
46. 364 U.S. 253 (1960) ; 364 U.S. 206 (1960). Both Rios and Elkins were "silver
platter" cases involving the use of evidence in a federal prosecution which has been ob-

tained solely through state action in an allegedly unreasonable search and seizure, and
at a later time handed over to federal authorities. Both cases held the evidence inadmissable if obtained in an illegal search.
47. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 236 (1960).
48. Id. at 238.
49. 81 S. Ct. 473 (1961).
50. Id. at 476, citing Wolf v. Colorado, supra note 40; Elkins v. United States,
supra note 44.
51. In his lone dissenting opinion in Monroe v. Pape, supra note 49 at 496, Justice
Frankfurter agreed that the facts as presented constituted a violation of due process;
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above statement concerning the question of incorporation of the fourth
amendment into the fourteenth amendment, he in effect reiterated his
previous position when he approvingly cited Palko v. Connecticut.52 In
the Palko case Justice Cardozo stated that insofar as due process under
the fourteenth amendment requires the states to observe any of the immunities "that are valid as against the federal government by force of
the specific pledges of particular amendments [it does so because they]
have been found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus,
through the Fourteenth Amendment, become valid against the states.""3
Monroe v. Pape5" clearly holds that freedom from an unreasonable
search and seizure by officers acting under color of state authority is a
right guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, and that a deprivation of
this right is sufficient to constitute a section 1983 cause of action.5" Although it appears that Monroe has also clearly answered the question as
to the source of due process clause protection of the right to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure, i.e., by virtue of an incorporation of the
guarantees of the fourth amendment into the fourteenth amendment; 5%
the source of the due process clause protection of the right to be free
from state action physical abuse, illegal arrest and illegal imprisonment
has yet to be clearly delineated. The standards to be used in evaluating
which rights are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" are apparently to be derived from the logic and philosophies of the current members of the bench.
Physical Abuse, Illegal Arrest, and Illegal Imprisonment. The right
to be free from illegal search is almost identical in nature to the other
rights which are commonly abridged by tortious police conduct. Each
deprivation of these rights represents an abuse by officers charged with
enforcement of the law, and each deprivation also effects the same basic
values of freedom and liberty. Regardless of the similarity of these
rights, the courts have progressed much more rapidly in the area of due
but disagreed, upon a "color of law" issue, with the application of § 1983.

The "color

of law" aspect of § 1983 is discussed at note 24 spra.
52. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
53. 302 U.S. 319 (1937), and reiterated in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,
329 U.S. 459 (1947).
54. Supra, note 49.
55. According to Mackey v. Chandler, 152 F. Supp. 579 (4th Cir. 1957), unlawful
search of a home by deputy sheriffs of a state is not a violation of § 1983 ; such a search
does not deprive a person of any federal rights protected by the fourteenth amendment.
In contrast to Mackey, there are other cases where a complaint alleging an illegal search
has been held to state a cause of action under § 1983. See, e.g., Geach v. Monohan, 207
F.2d 714 (7th Cir. 1953) ; Davis v. Turner, 197 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1952). But see, McGuire v. Todd, 198 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1952). See generally Comment, Civil Rights Act
Section 1983 and Illegal Search by State Officials, 10 STAN. L. IEv. 347 (1957-58).
56. See the textual quotation following note 49 supra.
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process protection of the right to be free from illegal search than they
have in the area of due process protection of the right to be free from
physical abuse, illegal arrest, and illegal imprisonment.
Concerning the individual right to be secure from unreasonable
physical abuse, the Supreme Court before the turn of the century rejected the suggestion that the substance of the eighth amendment had
been incorporated into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment; but did intimate that the latter clause would invalidate punishment or physical abuse (to convicted state prisoners )which would involve torture or lingering death. 7 More recently, the Supreme Court
has held that methods offensive to human dignity were ruled out by the
due process clause, but not as a result of any immunities granted by the
Bill of Rights."s The Court has also said that the fourteenth amendment
meant to withdraw from the states the right to act in ways that are offensive to a decent respect for the dignity of man, and heedless of his
freedom." If such is the case, it follows that a severe deprivation of the
right to bodily security may be capable of constituting a section 1983
cause of action. As might be expected, the section 1983 case decisions
in this area are in direct conflict with one another."0
The same considerations would seem to apply to the rights to be
secured from state action involving illegal arrest and illegal imprisonment.8 All that can accurately be said about these rights is that they are
capable of receiving federal protection along with the rest of the rights
57. Ex Parte Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447-48 (1890).
58. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 168 (1952).

In Rochin, evidence of nar-

cotics obtained from the plaintiff through artificially induced vomiting was required to
be excluded from a state court because the forced vomiting was a violation of due
process.
59. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (concurring
opinion) (second electrocution held not violation of the fourteenth amendment when the
first failed to produce death).

60. Lewis v. Brautigam, 227 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1955) (state law officers exacting

confessions of crimes by violence can be held civilly liable under § 1983); Deloach v.
Rogers, 268 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1959) (neither false arrest nor unjustified assault and

battery by state action constitutes a claim under the Civil Rights Acts). See also, Jack-

son v. Duke, note 29 supra; Monroe v. Pape, supra, note 49; Wakat v. Harlib, 253 F.2d

59 (7th Cir. 1958) (severe beatings and refusal of medical attention).

Concerning mistreatment in prisons, see Knight v. Bibb, 250 F.2d 283 (7th Cir.
1957), which held that in an action for damages under the Civil Rights Acts, based on
allegations of beatings and maltreatment of the plaintiff by officers of the state prison,
dismissal of the complaint was proper. But see, McCollum v. Mayfield, 130 F. Supp.

112 (N.D. Cal. 1955).

61. For § 1983 cases involving such rights see, e.g., Agnew v. City of Compton,
note 64 infra (false arrest) ; Deloach v. Rogers, note 60 supra (false arrest) ; Wakat v.
Harlib, note 60 supra (false arrest and imprisonment) ; Monroe v. Pape, 81 S. Ct. 473
(1961) (false arrest and imprisonment) ; Jackson v. Duke, note 29 supra (false arrest
and imprisonment).
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previously discussed. 2 The crux of the issue as to whether the federal
courts will protect these individual rights from state abridgement by invoking the fourteenth amendment would seem to lie in the interpretation
afforded to the word "concept" found in the phrase "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." If the current concept of "ordered liberty" requires that the protection from physical abuse, illegal arrest and illegal
imprisonment by state action be left to the states and the common law,
then these rights are not protected by the fourteenth amendment. If the
current concept of ordered liberty is otherwise, then so will the federal
protection of individual rights be otherwise.6"
Violation of the Due Process Clause. Assuming that the current
concept of ordered liberty judicially credits the fourteenth amendment
with securing the right to be free from physical abuse, illegal arrest and
illegal imprisonment by state action, the question then remains: how is it
to be determined whether a specific instance of tortious police conduct
has constituted a violation of due process? If it is assumed that not all
such acts are a violation of due process, the due process clause can then
be said to be analagous to the equal protection clause in that it takes something more (herein designated as a "plus factor") than just state action
which violates a personal right to constitute an abridgement of the rights
guaranteed by the due process clause.
The plus factor requisite to a violation of the equal protection clause
is the requirement of purposeful discrimination. The plus factor requisite to a violation of the due process clause in the police abuse area is not
as easy to identify as is the equal protection discrimination standard.
The existence of such a plus factor in a specific police abuse case is
necessarily dependent on the facts of the case.
It would seem that a section 1983 plus factor may arise through
three different types of fact situations. The first type centers specifically on the conduct of the police and the resultant injuries to the plaintiff. This plus factor results from a fact situation involving an abnormally severe and outrageous abuse of the plaintiff's individual
rights.64 The impact on the court of the shocking abridgment of the
62. See, e.g., Jackson v. Duke, 259 F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1958).
63. Federal protection under § 1983 of the individual right to be free from state
action illegal search seems to have been decisively granted in Monroe v. Pape, supra,
note 61.
64. A case involving § 1983 which appears to support the "plus factor" requirement
is Agnew v. City of Compton, 239 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1956). The court held that a
wrongful arrest based on an arresting officer's misunderstanding of a city ordinance
does not amount to a deprivation of a basic civil right and does not authorize recovery
against such officer under § 1983. Agiew can be explained in two ways. First, since
the arrest was just an innocent mistake, it likely would not have substantiated a common
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plaintiff's right at the hands of the police would serve to convince the
court that the due process clause has been violated."3
The second type of fact situation which may be capable of generating a plus factor involves a situation where there has been a deviation
from accepted law enforcement policy, but the deviation has not been so
severe and shocking as to fall within the previously mentioned "outrageous" category. In this situation, the plus factor may arise if the
plaintiff can show by his pleadings and proof that such deviations are a
common occurrence within his particular geographical area of law enforcement. Thus if a section 1983 plaintiff has suffered an illegal
search, and he can show that notwithstanding state prohibition of same,
such illegal searches are of common occurrence, a federal court may be
justified in concluding that the total impact of the situation supports the
plaintiff's contentions that his rights, as protected by the guarantees of
the due process clause, have been violated.
The third type of fact situation involves a person who has been
abused by police action and who has unsuccessfully attempted to obtain
retribution in a state through the remedies provided by his state. Such
a person should be allowed to show in a federal court that his state, after
utilizing all its corrective procedures and guarantees, failed to correct its
mistake by providing an adequate remedy. In the event of such a showing, it seems that the failure of the state's remedial processes furnishes
a plus factor on the basis of which a violation of the due process clause
may be supported." This last plus factor puts a much greater burden on
the plaintiff than the first two. In the first two the plaintiff may proceed from his police abuse directly to a federal court, while in the third
type he must first exhaust all his available state remedies."
law tort action for false arrest; secondly, the circumstances surrounding the arrest

were not shocking enough.
65. For an example of the shocking type of police abuse, see text accompanying
notes 30, 31 supra. Many of the severe § 1983 cases involve an illegal search, seizure and
arrest, followed by an illegal imprisonment and incommunicado detention, with beatings
and physical abuse generally included. Representative cases of this type include Monroe
v. Pape, supra, note 61; Wakat v. Harlib, 253 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1958) ; Jackson v. Duke,
259 F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1958) ; Geach v. Monohan, 207 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1953) ; Davis v.
Turner, 197 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1952).
66. For a derivation of this third type of plus factor, see McShane v. Moldovan,
172 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1949). Plaintiff McShane, as a result of an illegal jury selection which resulted in a prejudiced jury, was unlawfully imprisoned, convicted, and sentenced. She appealed to a higher state court and was acquitted before an impartial jury.
Although the state had provided her a corrective remedy in one sense, she then sought to
obtain damages under §§ 1983 and 1985 from the constable, complaining witnesses, and
justice of the peace who had combined in preparing the list of prejudiced jurors. Although plaintiff had not first exhausted her state remedies against the defendants, the
federal court held that a valid cause of action existed under §§ 1983 and 1985.
67. Such a delineation would serve well as a screening process under which minor
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THE FEDERALISM FACTOR

There is another external factor that plays an important part in the
judiciary's interpretation of what constitutes an "ordered" liberty, which
in turn has a serious effect on the success of section 1983 as an adequate
civil remedy. The factor referred to concerns the claims and obligations
of federalism. It is often contended that if section 1983 were to be
given a liberal application and thus a substantial effect, the result would
involve unwarranted federal supervision over state law enforcement
agencies.6" Prior to the Monroe case the Supreme Court had indicated
that the Civil Rights Acts should be construed narrowly so as to respect
the proper balance between the states and the federal government in law
enforcement, and they are not to be used to centralize power so as to upset the state-federal system. 9 As elicited by lower courts, "the Federal
Civil Rights Acts were not enacted to discipline local law enforcement
officials.""0 The prevailing conclusion has thus been that even if the
fourteenth amendment does prohibit unreasonable searches, arrests and
imprisonments by state action, there is an external limitation as to how
far the federal government can go in the supervision of state law enforcement agencies. The external limitation consists of the "delicate
balance" between state and federal authority, which allegedly must be
judicially maintained. 7 The decision in the Monroe case, by virtue of its
total lack of concern with the problems raised by section 1983 in regard
to the external limitations of federalism, would seem to indicate that this
factor is, at least in the area of state action illegal search, no longer of
controlling influence.
The views prior to Monroe, if carried to the extreme, would result
in a complete judicial abrogation of a clear legislative mandate."2 It is
clear that the legislature of 1871 contemplated federal supervision over
and inconsequential police deviations would be screened from § 1983 consideration until
such time as they have first been processed through state corrective procedures. Other
factors which indirectly aid the process of screening, and directly affect the successfulness of § 1983 litigation, are discussed in the text infra under the topic of Federalism.
68. See Jennings v. Nestor, 217 F.2d 153 (7th Cir. 1954); Swanson v. McGuire,
188 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Ill.
1960).
69. See Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951).
70. Egan v. City of Aurora, 275 F.2d 377, 380 (7th Cir. 1960) ; Jennings v. Nestor,
note 61 supra at 155; Mackey v. Chandler, 152 F. Supp. 579, 583 (4th Cir. 1957).
71. For typical court statements enunciating the need to keep the scales of federalism "delicately" balanced through the limitation of federal powers, see Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 134 (1954); Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 656-61 (1951);
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 64-66 (1947) (concurring opinion); Swanson v.
McGuire, 188 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Ill. 1960).
72. Section 1983 reads "every person . . . shall be liable ... " (Emphasis added).
Section 1983 is set out in full at note 11 supra.
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state government functions when it passed section 1983." It is also clear
that the present-day courts have not construed the obligations of federalism as precluding the enforcement of civil liberties, 4 most of which have
involved similar or even more severe disruptions in the balance between
state and federal power than occur or are likely to occur through the
enforcement of section 1983.
The demands of federalism have not
prevented protection under the fourteenth amendment of the basic individual rights of freedom of speech, religion, assembly and the press."9
Federalism has not prevented the use of section 1983 under its injunctive
remedy in situations involving the above freedoms,"7 or the right to receive equal treatment under state laws."8 In this respect, an inherent
problem in section 1983 damage suits as opposed to injunctive remedies
under that section involves the fact that it is easier for the courts to prevent a deprivation of a civil right before it happens than it is to invoke
an atonement against the actor after he has caused the deprivation."
The fact that an individual right has been, rather than is about to be
abridged however, cannot logically serve to change the nature of the
right to such a large degree that it vascilates between being within or
without the fourteenth amendment. Congress did not have different
rights in mind when it included both equitable and legal remedies as
available under section 1983.
Another argument advanced on the federalism issue is the assertion
that if "police abuse" cases were allowed under section 1983, the numerous mistakes of law enforcement officers would each blossom into
federal civil suits, with the frequency of such actions resulting in an
overpowering burden on the federal courts and on effective state law
73. See the legislative history recorded in the March 28 through April 4, 1871
issues of the Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. See generally Gressman, The Unhappy
History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REv. 1323 (1952). See also Monroe v.
Pape, 81 S. Ct. 473 (1961).
74. Concerning the distinction between "civil liberties" and "civil rights," see note
1 supra.
75. See generally Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the
Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. REv. 1 (1950).
76. E.g., Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (freedom of
press) ; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (freedom of speech and assembly).
77. E.g., Douglass v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943)
(injunction granted under
§ 1983 to prevent denial of rights to freedom of speech, press, and religion).
78. E.g., Fayson v. Beard, 134 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Tex. 1955) (Negroes entitled
to free use of city parks) ; City of Greensboro v. Simkins, 246 F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1957)
(free use of golf course) ; Valle v. Stengel, 176 F.2d 697 (3d Cir. 1949) (free use of
city swimming pool).
79. Compare Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil

Liberties, note 36 supra at 11.
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enforcement.8" This is not a correct assertion in light of the analysis
given in the "rights protected" section of this note to the type of conduct and surrounding situation which must be present before the due
process clause may validly be considered as violated. Furthermore, the
fears concerning oppressive burdens are not sustained by experience.8 '
If all the cases currently brought in the state courts for "police abuse"
torts under the remedies provided by the common law were to be brought
in the federal courts, the resulting "case-burden" would be relatively
minimal.82 Even if the case burden would be greatly increased, such an
expected result is not a valid reason to deny an existing statutory remedy.
The same "overload" argument could have been and no doubt was vehemently expressed two decades ago when the courts first began enforcing the first amendment freedoms against the states through the fourteenth amendment. The great advances made since that time in the
preservation of basic individual rights against state action belies the
validity of any "overload" argument.
The asserted financial burden on law enforcement officers as a result of allowing section 1983 actions has not proven to be serious either.
This is particularly the case when the community or state governmental
unit involved undertakes the defense of such suits (as is often the case)
and when the judgment burdens are spread among the general populace
through the means of "police tort judgment indemnification" statutes.83
Of course, even a complete absence of such financial aids to law enforcement officers would not be a valid reason for allowing these officers to
80. See Swanson v. McGuire, 188 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Ill. 1960). See generally
Comment, 10 STAN. L. Rxv. 347, 351 n. 20, and 355 n. 34 (1957-58).
81. Since Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939), gave strong federal recognition to
§ 1983, only thirty-eight suits under the Civil Rights Acts against police officers have
been reported in the Federal Reports. Even the extremely broad case of Picking v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 776 (1945), did not re'sult in a flood of § 1983 cases. Only four § 1983 cases have been reported in the Third
Circuit since that time. No police abuse § 1983 cases have been reported in the First,
Tenth, or District of Columbia Circuits.
82. In the city of Chicago, Illinois, only thirty-one suits of this type were filed in
1959, although the Police Department of Chicago made "two hundred seven thousand
physical arrests . . ." in 1959. 1959 Annual Report, City of Chicago, Department of
Law 29. Assuming that 'all of the thirty-one cases had been filed in the Northern District of Illinois under § 1983, the court work-load would have averaged less than four
cases to each of the eight Northern District Federal Judges. Few of these type suits
appear to reach the state courts of review. In the past ten years, only five cases of this
type are reported from the Illinois Appellate Court, and only one from the Illinois Supreme Court.
83. An example is ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 1-15 (1959), which imposes upon the
city of Chicago the obligation to indemnify its police officers for judgments recovered
against them arising out of injuries resulting from the performance of their police
duties (excepting cases involving wilful misconduct by such officers). For a listing of
the numerous other states which have such statutes, see 2 McQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 532 (2d rev. ed. 1939). Also see Comment, 48 NEv. U.L. Rv. 377 (1953).
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deprive others of individual rights protected by section 1983. The theory
of tort law has always been that a person subjects himself to liability
when he breaches his social duties toward others, and section 1983 is an
extension of this concept only in that it provides a federal statutory
remedy as a means of obtaining redress.
The solution to the federalism problem involved in section 1983
ideally lies in the area of new and improved legislation. As long as section 1983 remains enacted in its present form however, it is important
that the courts in their endeavor to preserve the equilibrium between
federal and state law enforcement powers do not entirely close their eyes
to section 1983. To do so would be to deny a specific statutory remedy
on the assumption that section 1983 results in a rupture of the balance
of federalism. Such an assumption is of doubtful validity in light of
the fact that convictions under the criminal counterpart84 of section 1983,
which involve a punitive action by the federal government instead of a
mere civil action by a private individual, have not produced any serious
federalism problems.
The "rigorous" demands of federalism are continuously being relaxed in favor of increasing federal authority over the states in many
areas, with the area of protection of civil liberties in the forefront of
the advance.8 5 The Monroe decision seems to indicate that section 1983,
in the police abuse area, will not continue to be suppressed by the constitutional doctrine of federalism.
THE IMMUNITIES FACTOR

An additional issue affecting the success of section 1983 litigation
involves the common law concept of immunity from tort liability. 6 In
order to provide relief for the plaintiff subjected to police abuse, a section 1983 damage action requires a defendant capable of incurring tort
liability. Two possible defendants emerge from an abuse of civil rights
by state action; the police officers involved, and the municipal units
which employ the officers, through the doctrine of respondeat superior.
For the purposes of this discussion, the possible tort immunity of individual police officers will be termed "official" immunity, and possible
immunity relating to their employers will be termed "governmental"
immunity.
84. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1958).
85. See Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, note 36 supra at 11.
86. Although injunctive relief under § 1983 is not subject to these immunities, e.g.,
Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932), it is seldom that such relief will provide an
adequate remedy for a police abused plaintiff. The damage is usually done before the
victim has a chance to invoke an injunctive remedy.
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Official Immumity. Section 1983 states that "every" person shall be
liable. The question arises whether Congress by the use of such language
meant to abrogate the immunity from tort liability granted to certain
state officials by the common law." It is arguable that Congress, though
making no provision on the question, did intend in section 1983 to
abolish such immunity." In Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., s9 the court
held that a cause of action was stated against a justice of the peace, the
Pennsylvania Railroad, and the Governor of Pennsylvania; and said
further that the language of section 1983 is all embracing and is capable
of invoking tort liability against literally "every" person who deprives
another of his civil rights while acting under the color of state law. Although certiorari was denied to the Picking case, the principle therein
was subsequently limited by the Supreme Court in Ten ney v. Brandliove.0
Tenny involved section 1983 immunity in regard to a state legislative investigating committee which was charged with having deprived the plaintiff of his right to free speech. The Court held that in the absence of
clear statutory language it could not be supposed that Congress intended
to disregard the long-standing immunity enjoyed by legislators. Because
the Tenney case was concerned only with legislators, it is of little assistance in regard to the immunity problems raised by law enforcement
"abuses." Actions brought under section 1983 have been directed against
law enforcement officers ranging from state governors to deputy sheriffs, including judges," prison superintendents,9" state attorneys 9 3 county
87. For an extensive discussion of tort liability immunities, see Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REv. 263 (1937). For discussion of such
immunities as applied to the Civil Rights Acts, see note, Doctrine of Official Immunity
Under the Civil Rights Acts, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1229 (1955); Comment, 54 MicH. L. REv.

696 (1956).
88. See Note, The Proper Scope of the Civil Rights Acts, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1285,
1296 n. 56, 57 (1952-53).
89. 152 F.2d 753 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. deied, 332 U.S. 776 (1946).
90. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
91. judges have traditionally been immune from civil liability based upon acts of
discretion within their authority. See PROSsER, TORTS 780 (2d ed. 1955). Their immunity has remained intact under § 1983. See Baldwin v. Morgan, 251 F.2d 780, 786
(5th Cir. 1958) ; Tate v. Arnold, 223 F.2d 782 (8th Cir. 1955) (held, the common law
rule of immunity of judicial officers for acts done in the exercise of their judicial functions has not been abrogated by § 1983).
92. Superintendents and guards of state penal institutions seem to have a special
immunity of their own concerning § 1983 liability. A representative § 1983 case has
held ". . . federal courts have an extremely limited area in which they may act pertaining to the treatment of prisoners confined to state penal institutions." United States v.
Rogers, 237 F.2d 953, 955 (7th Cir. 1956). Claims of abusive treatment of state prisoners
have been held outside the jurisdiction of the federal courts and Civil Rights Acts. E.g.,
Eaton v. Bibb, 217 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1954). Indictments of prison officials for such
civil rights offenses have been upheld under 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1958) in the Fifth Circuit.
See United States v. Walker, 216 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1954).
93. Although generally held to be immune from § 1983 liability (see Kenney v.
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health officers,"4 sheriffs, and justices of the peace." 5
The widely accepted common law "judicial" immunity" cannot rationally be extended to include the various lower echelon administrative
officers of a state. The courts have therefore experienced serious difficulty in attempting to determine the extent to which these officers should
be granted "official" immunity from section 1983 liability. In this respect, the officer causing the most difficulty has been the sheriff. Following the majority of the state courts,9 7 the federal courts have usually
denied section 1983 immunity to tortious acts of sheriffs."8 Such denials would seem to be valid in view of the fact that the office of sheriff
has long been considered a "ministerial" position as opposed to a "discretionary" one."
While discretionary officials usually enjoy immunity
for all acts within their authority, the accepted view is that ministerial
officers are fully liable for their negligent acts.1"'
Most significant from a section 1983 viewpoint, a few federal courts
have extended judicial "discretionary" immunity to sheriffs. A recent
example is Stift v. Lynch,'' which has since been followed as authority
by M1onroe v. Pape'° 2 and Egan v. City of Aurora.' Defendants in Stift
included a judge, a state attorney and his assistant, a justice of the peace,
a sheriff, and a deputy sheriff. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
specifically invoked common law official immunity down to and including the justice of the peace. The Court then ignored0 . or erroneously
Fox, 232 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1956) ; Crawley v. Warren, 216 F.2d 74 (7th Cir. 1954)), a
state prosecuting attorney was held liable in Lewis v. Brautigam, 227 F.2d 124 (5th
Cir. 1955).
94. Hoffman v. Holden, 268 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1959) (county health officer held
liable under § 1983).
95. Justices of the peace were held liable in Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., note 89
supra, and McShane v. Moldovan, 172 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1949). Immunity was granted
to such officers in Stift v. Lynch, 267 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1959) and by numerous
authorities cited therein.
96. See note 91 supra.
97. Additional weight to the view that sheriffs are not immune from tort liability is
added by the RESTATrMENT, ToRTs § 656, comment d (1938).
98. Lewis v. Brautigam, note 93 supra; Geach v. Monohan, 207 F.2d 715 (7th Cir.
1953).
99. See generally Keefe, Personal Tort Liability of Administrative Officials, 12
FoRp. L. REv. 130 (1943). Professor Keefe at 136 gives a list of types of officials
whose positions have been held to be ministerial. Included therein are sheriffs, constables and county attorneys. However, the activities of a county attorney may assume
a judicial flavor as opposed to ministerial, depending on the nature of his activities. For
example, he would appear to be acting "judicially" when he initiates a criminal prosecution.
100. See PROSSER, ToRTS 781-82 (2d ed. 1955).
101. 267 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1959).
102. 272 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1959), reversed, 81 S. Ct. 473 (1961).
103. 275 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1960).
104. Ignored: Geach v. Monohan, note 98 supra (held, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs
are not immune from § 1983 liability).
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distinguished. 5 adequate "sheriff" authority from its own circuit and
from other circuits," 8 disregarded the common law of the state in which
the action arose (Illinois),' and held that relief could not be granted
under section 1983 against the sheriff and his deputy. Three Seventh
Circuit cases were relied on as supporting authority, none of which were
on point. 0 The impact of Stift v. Lynch seems to be an unexplained expansion of the "prison administration privilege"'0 9 to sheriffs and other
peace officers.
A case such as Stift v. Lynch serves to exemplify the need for
further judicial analysis of the legal issues involved in the invoking of
"official" immunity as a bar to section 1983 litigation. Admittedly, the
area is not an easy one in which to work. The simplest solution, that of
applying the rules of the state in which the deprivation occurred, seems
particularly undesirable. First, the adequacy of a federal statutory
remedy would be undesirably dependent on the factor of in which state
the deprivation happened to occur. Second, the state laws that would be
used in determining the presence of immunity (and thus the sufficiency
of the federal complaint) are often in a very confused status."0 Third,
a deprivation of a federally secured right invokes a consideration in favor
of recovery which is not present in suits under state law.
105. Erroneously distinguished: Wakat v. Harlib, 253 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1958)
(held, defendant police officers of Chicago liable under § 1983 and 1985(3); $15,000
damages awarded). The court in Stift v. Lynch, 267 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1959), held that
Wakat v. Harlib, supra, should be distinguished because in that case there was an element of discrimination (i.e., a police regulation which required a different treatment for
a class of persons designated as "well-known criminals"). It requires considerable imagination to use the "discrimination" element as a sufficient basis on which to distinguish
Wakat v. Harlib with reference to the liability of law enforcement officers under § 1983.
If there is a distinguishing factor between these two cases concerning police liability
under § 1983, it should concern the fact that Wakat involved police officers and Stift
involved a county sheriff and his deputy. This difference does not appear important.
106. One case which was ignored, specifically held a sheriff and deputy sheriff liable under § 1983: Davis v. Turner, 197 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1952).
107. A sheriff is liable both for malfeasance and nonfeasance in the performance
of his duties. McWilliams v. Richland County, 16 Ill. App. 333 (1885). This obligation
on the sheriff exists independently of his official bond. People ex rel. Stubblefield v.
Wochner, 244 Ill. App. 30 (1927).
108. Eaton v. Bibb, 217 F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1954) ; Miles v. Armstrong, 207 F.2d
284 (7th Cir. 1953) ; United States v. Ragen, 237 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1956). Eaton IV.
Bibb relied on Miles v. Armstrong for authority concerning the immunity of a sheriff.
Miles, which failed as a § 1983 action because there was no color of law involved, never
reached the question of a sheriff's immunity from tort liability under § 1983. More
significantly, United States v. Ragen didn't involve a sheriff, but concerned abuse by a
prison official.
109. In regard to the "prison administration privilege" and police abuse, see note
92 supra.
110. See generally Keefe, Personal Tort Liability of Administrative Officials, note
99 supra; Note, Doctrine of Official Inni zcity Under the Civil Rights Acts, 66 HARV. L.
REv. 1229 (1955).
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The policies that exist in favor of immunity from liability under
state law may be overridden by the purpose of the Civil Rights Acts
when recovery is sought thereunder. Therefore, even if state law was
both clear and uniform among the states, the traditional state reasons
for granting immunity might not furnish sufficient justification to act
as a restriction on the broad purposes of the Civil Rights Acts. Any
solution to the problem, short of legislation, would seem to demand a
form of "federal" common law. It seems that a federal approach of this
type would be at least a first step toward a solution of the problem pre11
sented by the "official immunity" facet of section 1983.
Governmental Immunity. Another relevant aspect of the tort liability immunity problem is whether the governmental unit which employs
a law enforcement officer can, under the theory of respondeat superior,
be held liable under section 1983. Governmental liability is important in
order to provide financially responsible defendants. The fact that the
normally underpaid police are usually judgment proof leads to the conclusion that civil actions for damages are more in the realm of fiction
than fact if governmental immunity applies." 2 It also seems important
to place the financial loss at the policy making level if law enforcement
agencies are going to be effectively encouraged to respect the rights
which section 1983 should protect.
Legal writers have long been advocating the assumption of comnmunity liability for the torts of public officers." 3 Although the legislative history of section 1983 is not specific on the subject of governmental liability, 4 Congress does have the power to subject municipalities
to suit for due process and equal protection violations by their officials,"'
and it is foreseeable that section 1983 might thus be interpreted as a
111. If federal law were to be used in this area, additional problems of federalism
might arise. Although official immunity may not be essential for the effective functioning of a state government, federal rule-making in the immunity area would be sure
to invoke the wrath of those who feel that the result of such action would be to hinder
(by financially burdening state law enforcement officers) the effectiveness of state law
enforcement. The solution to this problem would seem to lie in the area of state governmental reimbursement, discussed note 76 supra and accompanying text; or in the area
of respondeat superior, discussed in the text accompanying this note.
112. See Hall, Police and Law in a Democratic Society, 28 IND. L.J. 133, 153-54

(1953).
113. See Smith, Municipal Tort Liability, 48 MIcH. L. REv. 41 (1949); Comment,
Municipal Responsibility for the Torts of Policeman, 42 YALE L.J. 241, 244-45 (1932);
Fuller & Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 HARv. L. REv. 437 (1941).
114. Little help is to be gained by looking at the common law at the time of the
enactment of the Civil Rights Acts. The law at that time in the area of governmental
immunity was, if anything, in worse confusion than it is today.
115. See, California v. United States, 320 U.S. 577 (1944) ; United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
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limited congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity."'
The
Supreme Court however, in Monroe v. Pape, held that on the basis of the
legislative history of section 1983, it was not the intent of Congress to
make municipal corporations liable under the act."'
CONCLUSION

The issue of which specific individual rights are secured to persons
by the "Constitution and laws" and thus will, when abridged, support a
section 1983 cause of action, has yet to be satisfactorily judicially delineated. The Supreme Court made a limited but significant advance in this
area when it held in Monroe v. Pape"' that the individual right to be free
from illegal search by state action is guaranteed by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment and that a deprivation of the right constitutes a section 1983 cause of action. Regrettably, the emphasis in the
Monroe decision was on only one of the individual rights of which the
plaintiff was deprived; yet many situations of severe police abuse arise
where an illegal search is not involved.
Important questions thus remain unanswered. Are the individual
rights which are subject to police abuse (other than freedom from illegal
search) secured by the guarantees of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, and if so, is section 1983 an appropriate remedy for
a deprivation of such rights? Assuming an answer in the affirmative, a
further problem arises in determining the type or manner of abridgement
or "plus factor" that must be shown before a plaintiff may be said to
116. Significantly, federal law has been held in many other areas of civil law to
transcend the state common law differences involving sovereign immunity. See Workman v. New York City, 179 U.S. 552 (1900). Holding a governmental unit liable under
§ 1983 would require a construction of the word "person" (contained in § 1983) as including a state governmental unit as well as individual persons. The federal courts have
often given such a construction, e.g., Plumbers Local 298 v. County of Door, 359 U.S.
354, 359 (1959).
117. The Court noted that in its original form the bill made "'the inhabitants of
the county, city, or parish'" liable to the injured, but that this form was rejected by the
House. 81 S. Ct. 473, 484-5 (1961). If § 1983 should happen to be construed in a different light in the future in regard to governmental immunity, the relevant question
would arise of which law should control the issue of immunity, state or federal? Although the Supreme Court has never considered this question in regard to § 1983 liability, a landmark case in the area is Workman v. New York City, 179 U.S. 552 (1900).
There the plaintiff's boat was struck by a New York City fire boat and the city, although claiming immunity to tort liability, was held liable. The Supreme Court stated
that under a federal statute, i.e., Federal Maritime Law, the federal decision and not
state law is controlling. It seems that because of the federal question involved in a §
1983 action, federal law should control the question of governmental immunity. This is
especially true in light of the views recently expressed in Indian Touring v. United
States, 350 U.S. 61, 65 (1955), where the Supreme Court described state law on the
subject of governmental immunity, both inside each state and among the various states,
as being in "irreconcilable conflict."
118. Supra, note 61.
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have been deprived of due process of law. A relevant factor in this determination, which causes additional difficulty, is the question of how
abnormal and shocking to the judicial senses must the police conduct
have been.
The proper scope of section 1983 as determined by the judicial obligation of maintaining a correct balance between federal and state powers,
a recurring issue in section 1983 litigation, was virtually ignored by the
Supreme Court in the Monroe case. The Court concerned itself primarily
with the relatively unimportant'19 "color of law" issue, disregarding the
fact that the Monroe case was rejected by the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals not on "color of law" but on the basis of stare decisis of previous
Seventh Circuit cases, all of which expressed strong feelings in regard to
a federalism inspired limitation of section 1983. If the Court was attempting in Monroe to convey feelings of section 1983 supremacy over
the obligations of federalism, it chose in the "color of law" issue a poor
medium with which to accomplish its objective. It is doubtful that the
Monroe decision will have a significant impact on those lower federal
courts which have regarded the obligations of federalism as an inherent
limitation on the scope of section 1983. Such an effect would seem
especially appropriate in the section 1983 police abuse cases where the
facts are not as shocking as they were in Monroe. A less severe fact
situation would allow federalism objections to be incorporated into a decision holding that the alleged facts do not constitute a denial of due
process of law, and thus are not capable of invoking section 1983.
The decision in Monroe has effectively absolved municipalities from
section 1983 liability. The impact of this absolution may be limited by
the increasing practice of municipal reimbursement of tort judgments
which have been rendered against law enforcement officers. In regard
to civil immunity of law enforcement officers from section 1983 liability, it is clear that extensive legal work by the federal courts is needed
if the quagmire of state law in this area is to be avoided.
It is evidenced by the widespread confusion that a re-evaluation by
the courts of the legal principles involved in section 1983 litigation is
119. That the "color of law" issue may correctly be described as relatively unimportant in the Monroe case, supra note 61, is borne out by the way in which the issue was decided: "we conclude that the meaning given 'under color of' law in the
Classic case and in the Scrcz s and Williams cases was the correct one; and we adhere
to it." The above cited cases, United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) ; Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) ; Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1950) ; have
been given great weight in regard to their Civil Rights Act "color of law" holdings by
both the Supreme Court and the lower courts. It seems highly improbable that the Court
in Monroe had any serious intentions of overthrowing this previously well established
authority on the "color of law" issue. It may well be that the federalism issue was in
reality the problem involved in the "color of law" discussion.
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needed.
Many of
1983 are
seriously

The Monroe decision, while helpful, left much to be desired.
the objections expressed to police abuse litigation under section
of doubtful validity when viewed in the light that they are
impeding the application of a federal statutory remedy.

If federal protection of basic individual rights is desired, such protection may be implemented by giving an adequate remedial basis to section 1983. It is obvious however, that the implementation cannot be accomplished without a judicial expansion of the protective scope of the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, with a resulting subjection of state law enforcement to the restraints of federal power. The
fact that the courts are so often presented with the problem of making a
choice between inconsistent objects of desire does not present a cogent
excuse for their failure to develop adequate legal standards in the area
of section 1983 litigation.

TRANSFER OF CIVIL ACTIONS UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
The Judicial Code Section 1404(a) provides, "For the convenience
of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may
transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might
have been brought."1 The purpose of this statute is to enable the trial
of an action to be held in the forum most convenient for all persons and
interests concerned, and the language of the statute clearly appears to
direct this result. In spite of the seemingly unambiguous language, the
attempt to interpret 1404(a) correctly has resulted in an astonishing bulk
of litigation. One of the most controversial problems arising under the
statute, the proper interpretation of the phrase "where it might have been
brought" has recently been resolved by the United States Supreme Court
in the case of Hoffman v. Blaski.2 Many problems however still remain
and demand solution.
In the Blaski case, the Supreme Court severely limited the scope of
1404(a) by holding that the statute presupposes two proper forums in
which the plaintiff can commence his action. The plaintiff began a patent infringement action in the District Court for the Northern District of
Texas, the place of the alleged infringement and thus the proper venue
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1950).

2. 363 U.S. 335 (1960).

